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NOTE
THE GREENSTEIN ACT: THE NEED FOR A NEW
APPROACH TO THE TREATMENT OF
PSYCHOPATHIC CRIMINALS
One unsolved problem in criminal administration is the disposition of
criminals who do not meet the legal tests for insanity and yet suffer from
mental disorders which make imprisonment inappropriate for them; the
plight of such offenders in Pennsylvania is illustrated by three recent cases.
Three volunteer firemen admitted setting twenty-one fires in a six-month
period. It was later learned that the incendiary activities of two had started
about ten years before with field fires and had gradually progressed from
the burning of abandoned outbuildings to barns, homes, and automobiles.'
The firemen would ignite the blaze with rope fuses, return home until the
siren sounded, and then rush back to aid in extinguishing the fire. A
psychiatric examination showed that each knew the difference between
right and wrong when the acts were committed, but suffered from mental
abnormalities, two apparently being pyromaniacs. The county judge sen-
tenced them to long prison terms despite his regrets that "we have no
proper place to send them. We must send them to the Eastern Peniten-
tiary. Perhaps in the future there will be penal institutions for the proper
care of such individuals. If and when that happens, if I am still a judge,
I shall seek to have them transferred." 2 The judge's comments are
especially remarkable in view of the existence in Pennsylvania since 1933
of the Greenstein Act,8 which on its face would have permitted the sen-
tencing of the defendants to a mental institution.
THE CUIRRENT DILEmMA
These defendants are representative of that inexactly defined group of
offenders medically classified as "psychopathic personalities." 4 The psy-
chopath is not necessarily legally insane nor mentally deficient; nor is he
generally deemed to reach the degree of abnormality amounting to psy-
1. This information was gathered from a personal interview (Feb. 5, 1953) with
Mr. Earl H. Allen, chief detective of Delaware County.
2. The Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia, Sept. 18, 1952, p. 1, col. 1.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1223 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
4. Because the term "psychopath" is vague and often abused, it offers little help
in making any clear-cut psychiatric classification. See GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 86 (1952) ; KRAINES, THE THERAPY OF THE NEtROSES
AND PSYCHOSES 462 (2d ed. 1943); SMITH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL
146-7 (1922); TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 85-6 (Rev. ed. 1950); WOOD AND WAITE, CRIME
AND ITS TREATMENT 269, 273 (1941) ; COMMITTEE ON FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY, GROUP
FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 9, PSYCHIATRICALLY DEVIATED SEX
(224)
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chosis, 5 which is the degree commonly required for certifiability to a mental
hospital.6 The psychopath does, however, suffer from a mental disorder,
which is characterized by a compulsion to indulge in a particular kind or
kinds of antisocial behavior, typically coupled with an inability to learn by
experience.7 The psychopath may appreciate not only the wrongfulness of
the act, but also the high risk of punishment, and yet feel impelled to
indulge in the criminal conduct 8 Pyromania, kleptomania, and sex psycho-
pathy are examples of the antisocial behavior with which this Note is
concerned.9
There is no general agreement as to the cause of the psychopathic
state,10 but it appears that complex personality factors, varying widely
OFFENDERS 1 (1950). For example, pyromaniacs (pathological firesetters) and
kleptomaniacs (pathological thieves) are designated by some authorities as examples
of "psychopathic states," HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, A TExT-BOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
387 (6th ed. 1944), STRECKER, EBAUGH, AND EWALT, PRACTICAL CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
323 (7th ed. 1951), and by others as graphic illustrations of an "obsessive compulsive
neurosis," a form of psychoneurosis, BRASOL, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME 344 (1927) ;
BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 560 (1925) ; SMITH, op. cit. supra, at 109; STRECKER,
BASIC PSYCHIATRY 175 (1952) (compulsive "must" behavior); WOOD AND WAITE,
op. cit. supra, at 273-4; Spirer, The Psychology of Irresistible Impulse, 33 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 460-1 (1943). But since "it is the process and not the label
which is significant," (TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 85-6 (Rev. ed. 1950)) for purposes of
this Note it has been found helpful to set forth only in general terms the type of
person likely to be included by the label "psychopath" simply to focus some of the
considerations involved in the "process."
5. See HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 381; WOOD AND
WAITE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 269. A psychotic, generally, is one so divorced from
reality that he is unable to appreciate the rights of others, cannot conform to the
mores of his society, and is in "obvious disharmony with the responsibilities and
expectations of everyday living." STRECKER, EBAUGH, AND EWALT, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 372.
6. See table in STRECKER, EBAUGH, AND EWALT, op. cit. suPra note 4, at 69.
7. See GUTTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra. note 4, at 90; LANDIS AND
BOLLES, TEXTBOOK OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 281-95 (1950); STRECKER, EBAUGH,
AND EWALT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 310-1.
8. Ibid. See especially LANDIS AND BOLLES, op. cit. mpra note 7, at 285.
9. See note 4 supra, however, for the fact that all authorities do not agree on
this classification.
10. For a summary of existing theories see LANDIS AND BOLLES, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 291-4; STREcKER, EBAUGH, AND EWALT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 311-4. For
the two allied states of pyromania and kleptomania, among the suggested geneses
are hereditary, neurological, biochemical, psychological, or environmental factors,
plus a possibility of organic disorders. HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 384. The most widely accepted view is that these particular activities
are a relief phenomenon for repressed elements in mental life, the most significant
of such elements being sex. See ETTINGER, THE PROaLEM OF CRIME 191-2 (1932);
GLUECK, STUDIES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 241-53 (1916); HEALY, THE INDIVMUAL
DELINQUENT 772 (1915) ; SMITH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 110; Karpman, Impulsive
Neuroses and Crime: A Critical Review, 19 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575, 585,
587 (1929) ; Stekel, The Sexual Root of Kleptomania, 2 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
239 (1911). Some writers go even so far as to draw a correlation with the menstrual
or pregnancy periods in women. POLLACK, THE CRIMINALITY OF WOMEN 125-35
(1950) ; Moir, Some Medical Aspects of Crime, 8 MEDICO-LEGAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL
REv. 111, 125-6 (1940). Other professed theories are that they are the result of
an abnormal glandular condition (SCHLAPP AND SMITH, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY
213-20 (1928)), are founded on childhood impressions and patterns of behavior
(Lorand, Compulsive Stealing, 1 J. CalM. PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 247 (1940)), or
originate in a desire to change an unbearable situation (BLEULER-BRILL, TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 538-9 (1951)).
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with the individual, combine to compel the antisocial behavior." Similarly,
the treatability of these conditions cannot be discussed in any categorical
manner, but some of the relevant factors according to current opinion can
be indicated. Where the patient is rebellious, often the case with psycho-
paths,' 2 improvement is dubious, but where he is co-operative and anxious
for treatment, satisfactory results may perhaps be obtained even though
a long period of treatment may be necessary. 13 One author states that
even apparently hopeless cases can often be made to adjust in a controlled
environment where little demand is made on them, and where they have no
real responsibility; '4 other authorities put little stock in any kind of
therapy.' 5  Psychoanalysis extending over a long period of time'
6 or the
more economical group psychotherapy' 7 are the most promising forms of
treatment. 8 Perhaps the most that can be said in the current state of
psychiatric knowledge is that in determining prognostic trends, each
offender must be carefully evaluated with regard to all of the factors in his
character which relate to the cause, degree, and stage of his disability.'
9
In determining the disposition of a criminal, normally two alternatives
exist today-either the criminal is found insane according to one of the two
accepted legal tests, or he is imprisoned because he does not fulfill their
requirements.20  In most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, the "right
11. See especially STRECKER, EBAUGH, AND EWALT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 311-4.
12. See GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 104; LANDIS
AND BoLLEs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 294. In this respect the "psychopath" differs
from those classified as neurotics who normally seek help in treatment. Ibid.
13. See HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 392. SMITH, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 170-1, concludes that for treatment by psychoanalysis two condi-
tions are necessary: (1) desire on the part of the subject for a cure, and (2)
sufficient time. With special regard to pyromania, one authority concludes that the
offenders fall into two main groups-the first requiring intensive psychotherapy
with a view toward quick rehabilitation, the second demanding extended periods of
institutionalization. LEwis AND YARNELL, PATHOLOGICAL FIRESETTING 393 (1951).
14. KRAINES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 463.
15. STREcKER, EBAUGH, AND EWALT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 324.
16. See SMITH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 110, 171; Karpman, supra note 10, at
588.
17. This method was employed in Army Disciplinary Barracks and Rehabilita-
tion Centers during World War II. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. Cit. supra
note 4, at 105.
18. It has been pointed out that electric shock therapy is not permanently bene-
ficial. NoyEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 307 (3d ed. 1948).
19. See LEWIS AND YARNELL, Op. cit. supra note 13, at 393.
20. Many states make statutory provision for commitment to mental hospitals
or some other special treatment for prison inmates found to be insane. E.g., LA.
REV. STAT. tit. 28, §59 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14:854 (1937); OHIO GEN.
CODE ANN. § 1890-73 (Page 1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1223 (Purdon Supp.
1952). While such statutes generally seem to be aimed at insanity developed or dis-
covered after commission of the crime, some of these statutes permit hospitalization
of offenders with disorders not amounting to legal insanity. See text at note 42
infra.
A possible third alternative means of disposition is probation, available in all
but certain crimes. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1051 (Purdon 1930). How-
ever, such a procedure would appear undesirable in the case of impulse-ridden per-
sonalities.
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and wrong" test of M'Naghtei's Case 21 is applied to determine legal
insanity; since psychopaths do not meet this test, they are sent to prison
in the same manner as other criminals. The result is manifestly unde-
sirable, at least as our prisons are presently constituted.22 An attempted
rehabilitation, not punishment, is required.23  Since these persons do not
learn by experience and are impelled to their actions by obscure personality
defects, 2 4 ordinary legal sanctions can have little deterrent effect. The
stigma of commitment to a penal institution, along with the impersonal and
regimented atmosphere,2 5 is a formidable obstacle to treatment.26 Because
of the complex personality problems presented by psychopaths, individual
psychiatric study of each offender is a necessary prerequisite to a rational
program of treatment; 27 yet present prison psychiatric facilities are vir-
tually non-existent 28 Moreover, there is a tendency for these personalities
to create prison disturbances, and the repressive measures which result
increase, rather than diminish, the psychopath's difficulties.29 While these
disadvantages of prison exist to some extent with all criminals, they are
especially acute with psychopaths whose full co-operation is a necessary
concomitant of any attempted treatment.3O
21. ". . . to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200,
210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). For the history of the criminal test of insanity
in Pennsylvania see Keedy, Irresistible Impulse in Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 956, 983 n.185 (1952).
22. WOOD AND WAITE, CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT 280-1 (1941); Pollock, The
Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania Crimi l Law and Administration, 12 U. OF PIr. L.
REv. 587, 601 (1951) ; Legis., 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 727, 739-41 (1952).
23. "The treatment of this group has been taken over by legal authorities with
the consequence that there is no treatment, but only punishment. These persons
are ill, just as is the psychotic patient; and the habitual criminal is a socially sick
person who may have a recoverable or an incurable illness, the true nature of which
can be determined only by proper investigation. These psychopathic persons are
today treated by society just as unintelligently as were the definitely mentally ill
in the middle ages." KRAINES, op. cit. supra note 4, at 463. See also CuRTIs, THE
LAw OF ARSON 116 (1936); Braun, Legal Aspects of Arson, 43 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 53, 58 (1952); Karpman, The Principles and Aims of Criminal
Psychopathology, 1 J. CRIM. PSYcHOPATHOLOGY 187, 209 (1940); Pollock, supra
note 22, at 601.
24. See text at notes 10 and 11 supra.
25. The factors of impersonality and regimentation are discussed by LEWIs AND
YARNELL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 395.
26. Legis., 100 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 727, 740-1 (1952).
27. LEwIS AND YARN=LL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 390, 393.
28. WooD AND WAITE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 281-2. See also Note, The
Legal Disposition of the Sexual Psychopath, 96 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 872, 875 (1948);
Legis., 100 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 727, 740 (1952).
29. See SINGER AND KROHN, INSANITY AND LAW 152 (1924).
30. See text at notes 12 and 13 supra. Another feature of prison penology which
has been criticized as contrary to a theory of individualization is the definite term
of sentence. See, e.g., LwIS AND YARNELL, op. cit. supra note 13, at 393-4; Note,
The Legal Disposition of the Sexual Psychopath, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 872, 874
(1948) ; Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARV. L. REv. 453, 480-1
(1928). However, consideration of the indeterminate sentence, which is fraught with
procedural difficulties, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the
problems in regard to the indeterminate sentence in the Pennsylvania sex crime law
see Legis., 100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 727 (1952).
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Commitment of psychopaths to existing mental hospitals, even where
it is legally possible, 3 ' is also subject to serious objection. State mental
hospitals are already overcrowded and inadequate for the purposes they
are presently intended to fulfill,32 and cannot provide the prolonged and
individualized therapy required for many psychopathic offenders.33 More-
over, mental hospitals are reluctant to admit psychopaths 34 because these
partially-responsible individuals tend to cause incessant trouble, with dis-
turbing effects on the other inmates 5 Mental hospitals are not normally
equipped to handle criminals. Penal supervision programs, inimical to the
best interests of other inmates, are generally absent; yet it is important to
have adequate security provisions to prevent the escape of psychopaths
who often tend to be impulsive wanderers ° Aside from the possibility
of escape, there is the added danger in an institution not of the maximum-
security type that an inmate, especially a pyromaniac, might carry out his
impulses on the state institution.37 But, despite the severe inadequacies of
mental hospitals for the treatment of the psychopathic criminal, it has been
contended that commitment to such an institution, if of the maximum-
security type, is generally the best solution offered by our present institu-
tional system 33 In most jurisdictions, however, mental hospitals are not
available to psychopathic criminals, for most psychopaths do not meet a
definition of legal insanity as couched in terms of M'Naghten's "right and
wrong" test.39  On the other hand, jurisdictions which include in the
definition of the legally insane those subject to an "irresistible impulse"
have recognized that some psychopaths fall within this category; 4o a finding
of insanity under this test would generally result in the commitment of the
defendant as an insane person.4 ' In some states hospitalization of certain
psychopathic criminals, particularly sex psychopaths, is made possible by
31. See text at note 39 infra.
32. Pollock, supra note 22, at 600-1.
33. See text at note 13 supra.
34. For an example of the reluctance of mental hospitals in this area see Com-
monwealth v. Leeds, 32 Del. County Rep. 412, 417 (Pa. 1942). See also SINGER
AND KROHN, INSANITY AND LAW 152 (1924).
35. Id. at 151-2.
36. LEwIS AND YARNELL, PATHOLOGICAL FIREs TING 394-5 (1951).
37. For an illustration of an attempt to set fire to the incarcerating institution
see GUTTmACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 59 (1952).
38. In LEwIS AND YARNELL, op. cit. supra note 36, at 396, from the presently
available alternatives for the incarceration of psychopaths the authors choose the
institution for the criminally insane over prisons. They also suggest, however, at
394-5, that for certain types of offenders modern prisons are better than existing
mental hospitals.
39. See text at and notes 20 and 21 supra.
40. For example, kleptomaniacs have been held to be included within this test.
E.g., State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N.W. 503 (1901) ; see Note, 43 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 150 (1913). The fact that they are so included has even been used as an
argument for the wider adoption of the irresistible impulse test. Hall, Mental
Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 COL L. REv. 677, 704 (1945). Pyromania
would also appear to be included. See SmooT, LAw OF INSANITY 54 (1929).
41. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAw 266-76 (1933). See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1221 (b) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
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specific statutory provision containing no requirement of "legal insanity." 2
In Pennsylvania the Greenstein Act 4 offers the further possibility of
discretionary commitment of any psychopathic criminal to a mental hospital,
despite the fact that psychopaths generally do not meet the Pennsylvania
legal insanity test.44 This statute should be examined in the light of the
failure of the judge to utilize it in the introductory cases, despite his reluc-
tance to imprison the defendants.
THE GREENSTEIN AcT
The language of the Greenstein Act does not compel the conclusion
that the Pennsylvania legislature intended to permit psychopathic offenders
to be committed to other than penal institutions; imprecise draftsmanship
leaves the Act's coverage somewhat equivocal. The Act, as incorporated
in the Mental Health Act of 1951, provides that:
"Whenever any person is convicted of a crime punishable by sen-
tence to a penal or correctional institution, the trial court may defer
sentence and order a mental examination of the defendant to guide it
in determinifig his disposition.
"On report of the examiner that the defendant is so mentally ill
or defective that it is advisable for his welfare or the protection of the
community that he be committed to other than a penal or correctional
institution, the court may commit him . . . to a State institution
for the care of such mental cases in lieu of sentence to a penal or cor-
rectional institution. . . ., 4
42. See, e.g., CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE § 5502 (Deering 1944);
10 OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 13451-20 (Page Cum. Supp. 1952); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, §§ 1166-1174 (Purdon Supp. 1952) (sex crime law). For a general discussion
of the sex psychopath laws see GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 123-37 (1952).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1223 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
44. For the fact that Pennsylvania employs the "right and wrong" test see
Keedy, supra note 21, at 983 n.185.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1223 (Purdon Supp. 1952) (Italics added). This
statute was first enacted in 1933 and amended in 1935 to provide for a right of appeal
(Pa. Laws 1935, P.L. 352, § 1); has since been incorporated, for the most part
unchanged, in the Mental Health Act of 1951 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 1071-
1622 (Purdon Supp. 1952), amended, immaterially for the purposes of this Note, in
2 Pa. Laws 1951-52, P.L. 2053); and has received the indorsement of the Group
for the Advancement of Psychiatry (ComnrrRE ON FORENSIC PsYcHIATRY, GROUP
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 9, PSYCHIATRICALLY DEVIATED
SEX OFFENDERS 3 (1950) : "The Committee regards this law as applied to convicted
offenders as commendable for both simplicity and comprehensiveness."). The Act
generally provides for the deferring of sentence after conviction for a mental examina-
tion of the defendant on the initiative of either the court itself, the district attorney,
the defendant, or a person acting in the defendant's interest; an examination and
written report by a psychiatrist which shall be available to the court, district at-
torney, and defendant's counsel; and, where the court deems it advisable, commitment
of defendant to a mental institution instead of a prison, where he will be detained
until further order of the court. Compare the provisions of the Greenstein Act
with those of the recently enacted defective delinquent statute of Maryland: "The
Board of Correction is authorized in its discretion to transfer into the Patuxent
Institution any person sentenced to or confined in . . . [Maryland penal institu-
tions]. Such transfer may be made at any time the Board, in its discretion, de-
19531
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The coverage of the Greenstein Act has never been judicially delineated.
Its scope depends on which of three possible definitions of the statutory
phrase "mentally ill" 46 is accepted. These three possibilities are: (1) that
"mentally ill" refers only to persons who are "insane" in the legal sense,
(2) that it refers to persons who are certifiable under the present practices
of state mental hospitals, or (3) that it can be construed to apply to per-
sonality deviations less serious than these, but which the psychiatrist and
judge feel justify other than penal incarceration.
(1) It is clear that the Greenstein Act goes beyond the usual definition
of legal insanity as formulated in M'Naghten's Case 47 since the Act applies
only after conviction, a conviction ordinarily being impossible if the de-
fendant was "insane" when the crime was committed.48 In addition, the
legislation from which the Act evolved provided for defendants who were
mentally ill "though not insane". 49 It would thus be untenable to construe
"mentally ill" here to embrace only those who are legally insane.
(2) An argument for an application of the Act to a comparatively
narrow area beyond the limits of legal insanity is that the phrase "mentally
ill" should be defined to include only those persons who according to current
hospital practices are considered committable to mental institutions. 50 In
termines that it would improve discipline or aid in the safekeeping, treatment, train-
ing, employment or rehabilitation of such person." A defective delinquent is defined
by the act as a person "who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-
social or criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who
is found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or both,
as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require confinement and
treatment under an indeterminate sentence, subject to being released only if the in-
tellectual deficiency and/or the emotional unbalance is so relieved as to make it rea-
sonably safe for society to terminate the confinement and treatment." Detailed pro-
cedures are required to be followed before an individual can be designated a defective
delinquent. Maryland Laws 1951, c. 476, §§4(C), 5, 6-11.
46. The Act applies to the "mentally defective" as well as to the "mentally ill,"
but the former category will be disregarded for purposes of this Note. "Mentally
defective" has a generally accepted technical meaning, i.e., defective in mental capacity,
as feebleminded. NoYEs, MODERN CLINIcAL PSYCHIATRY 424-5 (3d ed. 1948).
Separate institutions have been established for the care and treatment of such persons.
47. See note 21 supra.
48. There is, of course, the possibility that a legally insane person can be
convicted because he did not raise the defense of insanity, or because a jury rejected
the defense although insanity is apparent to the judge.
49. For the text of the original Act see Pa. Laws 1933, P.L. 224. The legisla-
tive history of the present Mental Health Act of 1951, in which the Greenstein Act
appears in its altered form, indicates that it was simply a codification of existing
law and that no substantive changes were intended by it. 2 PA. LEGISLATIVE
JOURNAL 1158 (1951). ". . . this bill . . . is a codification of the laws as they
now appear on the statute books. The mental health laws were gathered together
and put into this code . . . for the purpose of effecting immediate amendments to
it. If this bill is passed and sent over to the Governor for his signature, and if the
Governor signs the bill, it will not change the existing law one iota. This is the
law as it is today." (Italics added). Senator John M. Walker, Chairman, Senate
Rules Committee, id. at 2022-3.
50. According to the Mental Health Act of 1951, requirements for voluntary ad-
mission are that the superintendent find that the applicant is mentally competent to
seek admission, is in need of care and will be benefited by admission. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 1162 (Purdon Supp. 1952). Where application is by a relative or
friend, two physicians must certify that the patient is or is thought to be mentally
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actual practice, the class of persons denominated committable consists
largely of those labeled psychotic by the medical profession, generally ex-
cluding deviates such as psychopaths.51 Under this definition of "mentally
ill" a defendant would have to be certifiable before the statute's descriptive
words following "mentally ill" are applicable, i.e., he must be certifiable
before the judge can even consider the advisability for his or the com-
munity's welfare of committing him to a mental hospital rather than a
prison. It might be argued that administratively this is the only practical
interpretation-that it would be unrealistic to ask judges to deal in dis-
tinctions any less clear than that between criminals who are psychotic and
those who are not; and that if present mental hospitals are to be the
receiving institutions, it is unreasonable to send them criminals with condi-
tions which might not meet their admission requirements for non-criminals.
(3) On the other hand, the language of the Greenstein Act could be
interpreted to cover any mentally abnormal defendant, as long as the sen-
tencing judge considered non-penal commitment advisable for the defend-
ant's or the community's welfare. This construction results from defining
the phrase "mentally ill" in light of the phrase concerning the advisability
of non-penal commitment 5 2 Such an interpretation would allow the judge
in each case of mental abnormality to determine whether or not the requisite
mental illness is present on the basis of whether or not non-penal commit-
ment is advisable.
Prior mental health provisions and their construction by the courts
provide additional arguments for a definition of "mentally ill" which in-
cludes more than persons ordinarily certifiable.5 3 Section 308 of the Mental
Health Act of 1923 in part provided for commitment to a mental hospital
of a person detained in prison awaiting trial or undergoing sentence who
was "insane, or in such condition as to make it necessary that he be cared
for in a hospital for mental diseases." -4 This quoted phrase was held in
Commonwealth v. Schirmer 55 to include not only those legally insane, but
ill or is in need of and will be benefited by admission. Id. §§ 1181-1182. For
commitment of non-criminals by a court a commission of two physicians and an
attorney must find that the person is mentally ill and a proper subject for admis-
sion, or is a proper subject for care, or that the public welfare requires commitment.
Id. f§ 1202-1203. The requirements of any of these provisions could be interpreted
so as to be met by the defendants in the instant case, but actual hospital requirements
for those being admitted are usually more restrictive. See note 6 supra and text at
note 66 infra.
51. For a discussion of the fact that mental hospitals have refused to admit
other than psychotic patients, see note 6 supra and text at note 66 infra.
52. See italicized portion in text at note 45 supra. This view is advanced in
Pollock, The Mentally Ill in Pennsylvania Criminal Law and Administration, 12
U. OF PrrT. L. Rav. 587, 600-1 (1951), and is strengthened by the fact that the mental
examination is to be secured "to guide it [the trial court] in determining his [the
defendant's] disposition.' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1223 (a) (Purdon Supp. 1952).
53. See note 49 supra for the fact that the present Act is merely a codification
of existing law.
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §48 (Purdon 1931), repealed in PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §1621 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
55. 32 Pa. D. & C. 36 (1938). See also Commonwealth v. Leeds, 32 Del.
County Rep. 412 (Pa. 1942).
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also "all cases of the mentally ill who may reasonably be said to require
institutional care and restraint." 56 Thus, "mentally ill" was construed to
cover one who was apparently a sex psychopath. 5t Moreover, since at the
time the Greenstein Act was passed there already existed this provision
in the 1923 Act for the commitment of at least all prisoners who were
certifiable, it appears that the purpose of the Greenstein Act must have
been to extend the sentencing discretion of the judge to allow commitment
to mental institutions of defendants who are not necessarily certifiable under
present practices. 58
Finally, while this third interpretation of the Greenstein Act is not
the only possible one, it is the one most consonant with the aims of the
medical profession. For many years a central goal of this profession has
been individualization of criminals through psychiatric examination and a
further application of psychiatry in treatment if the examination shows it
to be warranted.59 As a step toward accomplishing the desired individual-
ization, the Act should be interpreted to mean that all convicted criminals
shown by prior psychiatric examination to be in need of institutional
psychiatric care rather than prison incarceration should be placed, at the
judge's discretion, in an institution where this care is properly available.
So interpreted, the Greenstein Act points toward a new approach to the
problem of the criminal psychopath.
56. 32 Pa. D. & C. 36, 41-2 (1938).
57. After defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment for indecent assault, sentence
was deferred and a commission appointed to examine him under the old Mental
Health Act. The commission found that although he was not insane in the medical
and technical meaning of the word, defendant was in such condition as to necessi-
tate mental hospital care. The court held that it nevertheless had power to commit
him to Farview State Hospital for the criminally insane, and itself described the
defendant as a "dangerous psychopath." The defendant admitted that he appreciated
the nature and character of his criminal impulses, but confessed his inability to
control them. He claimed that he afterwards regretted having committed the acts
to which he was driven by his impulses. Id. at 38.
58. It is unlikely that the Greenstein Act added anything new in providing for
commitment after conviction and before sentencing, for Section 308 also applied "on
the production or appearance of any person charged with criminal offense, or on the
production or appearance before the court of such person under any other circum-
stances. . .. ." (Italics added). PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 48 (Purdon 1931),
repealed in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1621 (Purdon Supp. 1952). This would seem
to apply to persons appearing before the judge for sentencing after conviction. Nor
did the Greenstein Act add materially to existing investigative procedures. Section
308 provided for an inquiry by either two qualified physicians or a commission made
up of two physicians and a lawyer. These persons were then to make a report, and
from this plus any additional evidence he might think necessary, the judge in his
discretion could order the individual's commitment to a mental hospital. Compare the
investigational provisions in the Greenstein Act discussed in note 45 supra.
59. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code, 41 HARv. L. Rxv. 453, 462-82
(1928). See also Arnold, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 10 J. Clam. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 184 (1919) ; Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal
Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319 (1938) ; Karpman, An Attempt at Re-evaluation of Some
Concepts of Law and Psychiatry, 38 J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 206, 215-6 (1947) ;
Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 367, 373-7 (1928) ; Miller, A Plea for Selective Psychiatric
Treatment for Offenders, 37 J. CRiaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1947) ; Overholser, The
Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law, 16 B.U.L. REv. 322, 338-44 (1936)
Perkins, Partial Insanity, 25 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 175, 182-6 (1934).
THE GREENSTEIN ACT
THE INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION
Interpreting the Greenstein Act in the light of the above discussion,
the judge in the introductory cases was not required by legal considerations
to imprison the defendants. Other considerations, however, compelled im-
prisonment. The Greenstein Act's apparent solution to the problem of
the criminal psychopath is in fact illusory, partly because the Act is little
known, but chiefly because the alternative institutions to which psychopaths
could be sent under the Act are totally unavailable. The provisions of the
Act have been rarely applied,60 and probation officers appear to be almost
wholly ignorant of its existence.01 Correspondence with the superin-
tendents of the state mental hospitals confirms the conclusion that the Act
in practice does nothing but solve a procedural-investigational problem.6 2
Even for this purpose many courts used similar provisions in the old Mental
Health Act of 1923, rather than the pertinent provisions of the Green-
stein Act.
The primary cause of the Act's ineffectiveness has been the lack of
adequate facilities to carry out its purpose.64 Mental hospitals, for the
reasons discussed above,6 5 have been loathe to admit psychopaths; and since
judges desired the hospitals' continued cooperation for investigational
purposes, they could hardly compel the superintendents to comply with the
60. On the appellate level the Act has been discussed by only two cases, neither
of which is important for present purposes. Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa.
65, 178 Atl. 823 (1935) ; Commonwealth v. Green, 346 Pa. 172, 29 A.2d 491 (1943).
It is also interesting to note that in one use of the Act reported on the appellate
level, it was applied to a defendant who was improperly tried while insane and
convicted on what was in effect a directed verdict. Commonwealth v. Ragone, 317
Pa. 113, 176 Atl. 454 (1935). Since the Act would be invoked, if ever, on the trial
level, it is uncertain just how often it has been applied. But the superintendents
of the state mental hospitals and the Department of Welfare are in almost unanimous
agreement that the Act is seldom used for commitment purposes. In a communica-
tion to the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REw (Dec. 10, 1952) Dr.
Hilding Bengs, Commissioner of Mental Health, summed the matter up by saying:
"Although the statute was enacted May 2, 1933, as related legislation to the Mental
Health Act of 1923, it was used so infrequently up to last year that it was practically
inactive ...
"Even within the past year I doubt that it has been used more than half a dozen
times. . . . I know only of two instances where it was used to commit defendants
to a state mental institution." This letter and other communications referred to in
this Note are on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
61. This was learned from communications to the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAw REviEw. In one such letter a probation officer when informed of the existence
of the Act stated: ". . . we feel that this is a very good Act and will be used quite
frequently. Not being familiar with the Act, I will be unable to give you any further
information."
62. These superintendents indicated that of all provisions of the Act, that pro-
viding for psychiatric investigation is used most. There is no indication, however,
that even this provision has been used with any degree of frequency.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 47 (Purdon 1931), repealed in PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 1621 (Purdon Supp. 1952). It should be noted that this section covered
only a person "thought to be mentally ill;" the Greenstein Act covers all convicted
defendants.
64. See Pollock, supra note 22, at 600-1.
65. See text following note 31 supra.
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Act, even where they felt that the Act applied.66 Only Farview, the
Pennsylvania institution for the criminally insane, is a mental institution
of the maximum-security type adapted to the incarceration of criminals
requiring psychiatric care, but presently it is 35% overcrowded and has no
segregation facilities for the disturbing psychopaths. 7 But despite the
practical objections to its present operation, most superintendents thought
the Act a proper solution to the problem of the psychopath, were there
facilities enough to carry out its provisions. 8 Others expressed doubts as
to whether the expense would be justified in the present state of our knowl-
edge; a few thought most criminals were psychopathic but should never-
theless be imprisoned; and only one thought the Act was now effective-he
being the superintendent of the only state mental hospital which is not
working above its rated capacity. 69
Thus, on the whole, the apparent solution to the problem as offered by
the Greenstein Act cannot be invoked and, as in the instant cases, judges
can only sentence to prison persons falling within its scope, despite their
doubts as to the appropriateness of that institution. Similar problems have
arisen under the growing body of sex crime laws 7°0-there are none but
penal or inadequate mental institutions to which to commit sex psycho-
paths.71 Only a new and different institution with a staff trained for the
prolonged therapy and custody required in the care and treatment of
psychiatrically deviated offenders can offer hope of a solution to the prob-
lem, 72 but as yet only one state seems to have taken any steps in this direc-
66. This was the major ground stated by the judge in the introductory cases
for his failure to invoke the provisions of the Act. In order to maintain co-operation
with mental hospitals to fulfill any investigational needs, he had to refrain from
attempting any forced compliance with the commitment provisions of the Act.
67. Dr. John P. Shovlin, superintendent of Farview State Hospital, in a com-
munication to the UNVRSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW (Dec. 12, 1952).
68. The superintendents so indicated in communications to the UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW. In one such communication (Dec. 8, 1952) judge
Burton R. Laub of the Sixth Judicial District (Erie) concisely summarized the
problem when he said: "The act is a forward step along the road to solution if the
State follows through with the establishment of appropriate institutions."
69. This favorable report was received from Embreeville State Hospital which,
although the smallest in the state, is only 95% occupied. 90 PENNSYLVANIA MANUAL
995 (1951-52).
70. For a summary of this legislation see Legis., 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 727
(1952). It has been said that the only pragmatic justification for this separate sex
psychopath legislation is that it permits testing of new procedures in a limited area,
which may constitute an opening wedge for extension of similar procedures to other
psychiatrically deviated offenders. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW 133 (1952).
71. GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 133-4; Legis., 100
U. OF PA. L. REV. 727, 738-41 (1952). As a striking example of this difficulty,
Judge Laub, supra note 68, cited the case of a sex offender whose problem was
certified to the Department of Welfare for designation, pursuant to the new Act,
of the institution to which he should be sentenced. The Department designated the
Western State Penitentiary-the same institution to which the judge would have
sentenced him prior to the Act.
72. See LEWIS AND YARNELL, PATHOLOGICAL FIRESETTING 390 (1951); SINGER
AND KROHN, INSANITY AND LAW 414-5 (1924); Pollock, The Mentally Ill in
Pennsylvania Criminal Law and Administration, 12 U. OF PIr. L. REv. 587, 601
(1951). There is such an institution for sex offenders in Denmark. Tappan, Treat-
ment of the Sex Offender in Denmark, 108 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 241, 247 (1951).
THE GREENSTEIN ACT
tion.73  If the legislature is not yet willing to progress this far, in view of
the doubts of some psychiatrists as to the efficacy of treatment, it should at
the very least found an institution of more limited scope to demonstrate
through a research program 74 the extent to which psychopathic cases are
responsible for criminality and what positive treatment skills exist, in order
to make clear to the taxpaying and voting public whether the need is
urgent and the expense justified. Only then will special care and treatment
facilities of a permanent type be foreseeable. The kind of institution ad-
vocated by psychiatrists (including many of the present hospital super-
intendents) is a classification and specialized treatment center, "a colony
system, something between the prison and the mental hospital, where per-
sons showing such tendencies could be maintained and treated while learn-
ing to develop a sense of responsibility." 7 The institution might be an
entity in itself, or perhaps a building or wing of an existing mental hospital,
if that is the most the community will underwrite. Basic to the effectiveness
of any such institution are adequate staffing and a program of continuing
research. In order to fill both these needs, the facilities should be estab-
lished in metropolitan areas, close to or in conjunction with existing
medical centers, making possible the enlistment of the best psychiatric
talent.7 6
CONCLUSION
The Greenstein Act has existed in substantially its present form for
twenty years, a form which is capable of liberal interpretation to include
all convicted criminals requiring psychiatric treatment. Nevertheless, while
the Act offers a rational approach to the problem illustrated in the in-
troductory cases, it has been seldom used because none of the existing
mental institutions provide the type of facilities needed for the psychopathic
case. The next step should be further research and a new institution
adapted to these personality states, with the necessary staff to implement it.
73. Maryland Laws 1951, c. 476. The institution planned under the provisions
of the Maryland statute is discussed in GUTTMACHER AND WEmorEN, op. Cit. supra
note 70, at 106. Generally it provides for three separate divisions: the first will
be a diagnostic center in which criminals will be intensively studied, and which
will be engaged in active research; the second will be of the minimum-security type
to house intellectually defective delinquents; and the third will be of maximum security
to contain the psychopathic and neurotic habitual criminals.
74. Such a research program was established in California for sexual psychopathy
when that state appropriated $100,000 to initiate research "into the causes and cures
of sexual deviation." Cal. Stat. First Extraordinary Sess. 1950, c. 35.
75. HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE, A TExT-Boox or PSYcHIATRY 393 (6th ed. 1944).
See also BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 571-2 (1925); WOOD AND WAITE, CRIMEx
AND ITS TREATMENT 280-1 (1941); KRAINES, THE THERAPY OF THE NEUROSES AND
PSYCHOSES 463 (2d ed. 1943) ("Society, however, has as yet not advanced to the
point where it realizes its responsibility for furnishing large semi-hospital units where
persons with psychopathic traits can live a useful and constructive life in a controlled
and directed milieu.").
76. This has been suggested by Pollock, supra note 72, at 601. Another ad-
vantage of a metropolitan center would be the availability of student and part-time
talent.
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The legislature has created in the Greenstein Act an illusory solution to the
present problem; it should now progress further and bring that solution
into reality.
77
77. For a comprehensive discussion of the existing gap between proposal and
implementation in the criminal psychiatric field, see Dession, Psychiatry and the
Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319 (1938). This writer concludes
at 327-8: "Individualization of disposition and rehabilitation of offenders, if by these
slogans we mean something more than ordinary leniency, have to date been hatched
out of idea into realization only in scattered instances. . . . it is in the inherited
tradition to assign a great deal more work to our agencies of criminal law adminis-
tration than we would ever dream of equipping them to perform . . . . what we have
traditionally sought of criminal justice has been not so much actual as symbolic
performance."
